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Abstract
Local actors' perceptions of curricular and management changes in two
private schools and one neighboring public secondary school in the city
of Buenos Aires, Argentina, are analyzed. An exploration was conducted
of how, within an ideologically and politically pro-reform context and a
widespread acceptance of the "private school advantage," principals,
teachers, and students in these schools evaluated the changes (or lack of
them) in management, teaching, and curriculum orientations of the
secondary education sector.
 
2 of 35
Introduction 
In the debate over implementing “choice and free-market” mechanisms to correct the
deficiencies of public schools, it is often mentioned that in the eighteenth century,
philosophers such as Adam Smith, Thomas Paine and John Stuart Mill had already
advanced similar ideas (Wells & Stuart, 1993). Scott Sweetland (2000) noted that Adam
Smith argued that the fairest, most efficient method of providing education was for
governments to give parents tuition money and let them have the freedom to spend it at
whichever school they chose. Yet, when seen in the context of Europe in the eighteenth
century –where most educational services were “private and for-profit” and served only
a small fraction of the population—Adam Smith’s original quasi-voucher idea, loses its
contemporary appeal. Indeed, at that historic juncture the idea of educating every child
was itself hotly debated, and was considered either, dangerously utopian or the key to a
truly democratic society.
In some countries, and in spite of Adam Smith’s recommendations the once quixotic
aspiration that every child had a right of access to schools, was achieved not by the
growth of private education but through the expansion of government regulated and
financed systems of public education. The history of such expansion in areas of Europe
and the Americas during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is well known;
however, it is important to note that private schools never ceased to exist, and for the
most part those schools educated the children of the wealthiest citizens.
The coexistence of public and private schools as compatible providers of education,
each targeting a different segment of the population was a state of affairs. At the same
time, such coexistence was always marked by a sense of competition about which sector
was providing the best education. In very broad terms, in both traditionally centralized
educational systems (e.g., France and Argentina) and highly decentralized (e.g., the
USA), privately managed schools were regarded as excelling public ones in student
achievement and general quality. Despite this widespread commonly held belief, it is
only in the late 1960s that the notion that the private sector would solve the public’s
sector educational problems gained momentum and started to increase its appeal in
academic and political circles.
By conducting an exploratory qualitative study of public and private high schools, this
project aimed at obtaining insight into the “common sense” beliefs about private
school’s academic advantages over public ones. The main goal of this research project
was to explore local actors’ perceptions of curricular and management changes in two
private schools and one neighboring public secondary school in the city of Buenos Aires,
Argentina. The rationale for this project was to explore how within an ideologically and
politically pro-reform context and a widespread acceptance of the “private school
advantage,” principals, teachers, and students in these schools evaluated the changes (or
lack of them) in management, teaching, and curriculum orientations of the secondary
education sector.
The empirical data are drawn from three schools and, consequently, can not provide
broad-based conclusions that larger studies using randomly selected sample of schools
could. Nevertheless, this qualitative study can provide a more detailed analysis of local
actors, motivations and reactions to changing environments, and suggest possible
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explanations for patterns and activities which may be confirmed and further elaborated
by larger studies. Finally, this study attempts to understand the organizational and
curricular responses of a small number of schools, in the particular context of Argentina
during the period 1985-1999; but it does so with the understanding that schooling is
always a local enterprise which is embedded in regional and global contexts.
In the attempt to map and locate the changes happening simultaneously at the local and
global level using a comparative approach the first section of this article will discuss the
notion about the “private school advantage”. Section II will provide a summary of the
relevant changes in the Argentinean context. Section III of this article provides a brief
description of the methods used for data collection. Section IV presents the data
collected during the field work, including a general description of the secondary
education private sector, particularly during the 1980s and 1990s. Section V summarizes
the results of this research and concludes this article by reexamining the perception of
the “private school advantage” and the benefits of introducing market mechanisms in the
provision of educational services.
I. The “Private School Advantage”
The notion that the provision of educational services should be regulated by the market
or in a competitive environment is not new. Scholars such as James S. Coleman and
Milton Friedman who provided empirical support and theoretical arguments supporting
the notion that private schools are superior to public schools. The publication of the
“Coleman Report” in 1966 presented empirical evidence about the supposed superior
performance of private schools. This report resonated with the public’s common sense
and expectations, and the validity of its claims became a subject of debate and
controversy among scholars. The diffusion of Milton Friedman’s ideas had less popular
impact, yet their influence is strong today. Friedman proposed that to reduce the
inefficiency of the public system of schooling it was necessary to open the door to
competition through a free-market system. Friedman was among the first to propose a
voucher system, giving parents not only the right but also the means to send their
children to the school of their choice. It is fair to say that since the initial reactions to
Coleman and Friedman’s ideas, the debate over implementing market mechanisms for
the provision and evaluation of educational services, especially through the use of
vouchers, has intensified .
Perhaps no other work has contributed more to that debate in the USA and abroad than
Politics, Markets and America's Schools by John E. Chub and Terry M. Moe (Gintis,
1991; and Glass and Mathews, 1991 for critical reviews). In this book, Chub and Moe
developed a controversial argument regarding worldwide attempts to encourage
competition in education. The principal claim of these authors that state mandated,
democratic control of educational institutions promotes lack of autonomy and choice,
impeding educational equality and upward mobility, is well known. In addition, Chub
and Moe suggested that American society is full of people who could make excellent
teachers, but oppressive state regulation and certification requirements ensure that most
of them never teach. Clearly, these authors attempted to go beyond small or piecemeal
reforms and attempted to "prove their point that democracy is the problem and not the
solution" (Gintis, 1991, p. 382).
Chub and Moe’s proposed solution is to incorporate market-like incentives and
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discipline in education through vouchers, increased “choice,” and privatized services
because these give parents the right to chose and the power to make changes in schools.
Using some of the arguments advanced by Chub and Moe, Andrew J. Coulson (1994)
summarized the pro-market position as follows:
The central argument … is that the success of any human organization
depends on the unification of its participants' goals. In the case of a school,
this means uniting the goals of the teachers, principals, and support staff
with those of the students and parents. The public education system fails to
accomplish this task, often leading its employees to work at cross purposes
with their customers. In sharp contrast to this system is the free and
competitive market, in which employees must satisfy the needs of
customers in order to prosper. Applied to education, this approach would
alleviate most if not all of the problems discussed earlier.
The assumption is that a quasi-market will wisely solve contemporary educational
problems since parents know best what is good for their children. Thus, if schools are
accountable to parents instead of to an anonymous and bureaucratic public system,
schools will act in the interest of children.
There are, however, numerous objections to the implementation of market-like proposals
and to increase participation of for-profit educational initiatives (Gewirtz, Ball and
Bowe, 1995; Glass, 1994; Lauder and Hughes, 1999). Among these objections are that
competitive that a competitive school system: a) will tend to increase social, ethnic and
gender inequalities, and b) will favor higher income families, and certain ethnic and
religious groups that are in more privileged circumstances. To those and other criticisms,
the advocates for market-like programs usually answer that stratification is already a
problem that can not become worse, that previously implemented reforms have failed,
and the absence of choice does not eliminate the inequality problem. Coleman responded
to such criticisms thusly: 
The emphasis on equality means that the focus in education is on the bottom
of the performance distribution. My general conjecture is this: Policies that
focus on high levels of achievement and rewards for high levels reverberate
downward through the system, providing an incentive for students at lower
levels to improve. (Coleman, 1992, p. 261)
The pro-market choice model advanced by Chubb, Moe, Coleman and others relies
heavily on what Joseph Viteritti (1999) defined as the “private school advantage”. In
comparison with students in public schools students attending private schools are
expected to have:
Better performances on standardized tests;
Higher graduation rates;
More rigorous academic environments;
Safer schools;
More opportunities for their parents to participate;
More access to morally uplifting surroundings (very often in association with
religious based teachings);
More access to highly motivated teachers and administrators (motivation based on
efficient and less bureaucratized hiring, retention and promotion policies).
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The works of Chub and Moe, Viteritti and others indicate that in general, there is a
strong widely held perception of a “private school advantage;” however, as Rothstein,
Carnoy and Benveniste, (1999) pointed out, it is not an easy task to determine why
private schools appear to perform better than public schools:
Because private schools can select (and are selected by) their students,
analysts have not been able to determine whether private schools’
apparently superior outcomes (like test scores) are attributable to superior
private school practices or to more selective student bodies (1999, p. ix)
Rothstein, Carnoy and Benveniste also noted that solving the debate about the reasons
for the supposedly better performance of private schools will depend on studies which
can control for student background variables. Given the high political and economic
stakes in the debate about markets in education (both in the USA and abroad) reaching
consensus on this issue will be extremely difficult. Similarly, it seems very difficult to
imagine that the re-solution to this debate will emerge from an exclusively academic
discussion. And yet, to dismiss the importance of theoretical argument would be a
serious mistake. As Steven Klees wrote: 
My reading of the theory and empirics of literatures concerning educational
production functions and earnings functions, for example indicates to me
there is not agreement on specification. Each researcher basically gets the
results s/he wants, one researcher's results conflict with those of others, and
there is no good reason to privilege one as any closer to some “true”
measure of impact than any other. When a particular field becomes a focus
for ideological contestation, the differences in “facts” become even sharper.
(Klees, 1993, p. 7)
Privatization, market-like options, choice programs, and vouchers are at the forefront of
the education agenda in several countries and will remain key elements in the near future
(Pini, 2000). Indeed, it appears that increasing numbers of scholars (Sweetland, 2000,
Viteritti, 1999), the media (Fischman, forthcoming), and the public seem to be accepting
these quasi-market mechanisms and emulating private schools as the best hope for
“fixing” public schools. Internationally this acceptance can be registered at two different
levels: a) the promotion of different school voucher campaigns and other legislative
initiatives, and b) the noticeable increase of for-profit initiatives, marketing strategies,
and incursion of commercial interest into public schools (Fischman and McLaren, 2000).
Without doubt, these actions ,which tend to the partial or total marketization of the
educational sector constitute, diverse manifestations of efforts at school reform, in many
cases presented as inevitable due to the mounting pressures of a globalized world.
Several studies (Arnove, 1999; Rhoten, 1999; and Samoff, 1999) indicate that most of
these reforms are centered on “restructuring” the educational systems, with the dual
goals of producing financial savings as well as the thorough transformation of
objectives, epistemological bases, methods, and procedures of schooling
(Darling-Hammond, 1993, 1997).
These reform proposals are made not only by the staff of think tanks, the media, and
government officials, but also by international financial organizations and different
sectors of civil society. Undoubtedly, these proposals are happening in contexts in which
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neoliberal economic policies and the continuous attack and dismantling of the structures
of the welfare state operate at the level of the reconfiguration of governing practices
(Popkewitz and Brennan, 1998). These changes in governing practices are having direct
effects on the future of public education as a whole.
It is at this crossroads of global neo-liberal reform proposals, generalized beliefs about
the distinct perception of public and private schools, and attempts to improve public
education through privatization and “choice” that this study finds its focus.
II. Argentina’s Search for “Modernity”
Argentina is a country of 35 million people, and it has one of the lowest population
growth rates (1.6% per year) in the region (UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1999). There
is a relatively small population living in a large territory, with 12 inhabitants per square
kilometer. During the first three decades of the 20th century, the country’s social and
economic indicators developed at a rate and in patterns similar to the USA, Australia,
and Canada, creating and extending public education and health systems. Those
indicators supported the optimistic idea that Argentina was destined to become the
“United States of the South.” However, six decades later the social and economic
destiny of the country had greatly changed. By the 1980s, Argentina experienced an
economic and social recession, dominated by pessimism rather than hope:
The old optimistic picture was eroded by a profound stagnation in
production that led to a steep decline in incomes, social marginalization,
and educational recession all of which have been abetted by decades of
institutional instability and military coups resulting in ruthless repression.
Today, the descendants of those who migrated to Argentina to build a future
in this undisputed land of promise are opting out and going abroad,
disappointed by the lack of prospects. (Schvarzer, 1992, p. 169)
Unfortunately, Schvartzer is not alone in his description of the country’s political, social
and economic failures. There is general agreement that Argentina’s democratic and 
modernization failures are a result of a combination of successive political and economic
crises. With respects to democratization, the situation in Argentina has never been clear.
Between the years 1930 and 1983, a general consensus in support of democratic
institutions was missing. The whole society—but particularly the most powerful
corporative sectors, the armed forces, the Church, the business sector, the politicians and
the unions—have been practicing what could be called the “politics of cannibalism and
exclusion.” Guillermo O’Donnell (O'Donnell and Schmiter, 1986). argued that this is a
consequence of the configuration of the Argentinean state which was dominated by
corporate sectors of the civil society. This situation of dependance, O’Donnell contended
has in turn weakened democratic insititutions in the country. Similarly, Enrique
Peruzzotti called such a process the “Weimarization of politics”: “Weimarization
amounts to a process of de-differentiation between social and political power. It entails
the destruction of political institutions which lose all autonomy against the pressure of
organized social powers” (Peruzzotti, 1993,p. 128). In a context of Weimarization of the
society, constant antagonisms around which model of development the country should
follow (e.g., capitalism, nationalism, socialism, non-aligned) and how to obtain the
proper level of “social order” to become modern were often the central axis of the
political and social discussion.
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After World War II, as in most countries in Latin America, Argentina’s society debated
and in many cases suffered dictatorial imposition of models of development and social
order based on a “modernization paradigm,” which was a positivistic evolutionary
approach. The supporters of the “modernization” approach often saw contradictions,
multiplicity of standards, and lack of clearly defined rules as obstacles to overcome, as
the “advanced” countries of the West had done before. The followers of the
modernization paradigm pointed out that Latin America had to follow a straightforward
path of development from traditional societies to modern ones, a sequence of political
development that Jose Nun summarized as follows:
(1) social modernization (economic growth with the incorporation into the
world market, urbanization, development of education, and the mass media
of communication, geographic mobility, etc.), (2) diffusion of modern
values (universalism, achievement, future- orientation, social trust, etc.),
and (3) the installation of a representative democratic political regime.
Modernization seemed a necessary condition for the emergence and
stabilization of democratic government in the democratic-liberal sense.
(Nun, 1993, p. 9)
Not surprisingly, during the second half of the 20th century, the prevailing models of
development and “modernization” supported this evolutionary vision, in which social
segmentation and poverty were characteristic features of societies in the process of
modernization. More importantly, the illnesses of “traditional societies” such as
authoritarianism, poverty, hunger, and illiteracy were seen as transitory problems.
In Latin America, the modernization approach required the identification of sectors or
areas which were most likely to function as the engine of development. Politicians,
investors and analysts considered the following as the key questions: Which sectors are
capable of economic leadership in the modernization process? Are these economic
sectors in a cultural and moral position to lead the process? Are the economic and
cultural modernizers homogenous groups? For supporters of the modernization model,
the answers to these questions were found in the development of a national and
centralized State, able to lead the process, and guide societies to “modernity.” However,
that leadership role presupposes at least two parallel dynamics.
First, the State itself has to become modern and encourage appropriate civic behaviors
through rational organization, efficient bureaucracies, and cultural and educational
developments. The public education system, created in the 19th century with the specific
purpose of developing a sense of citizenship, was also conceptualized as the engine of
cultural modernization. Moreover, the provision of educational and social services has
had a long history of redistributive effects (social mobility) as well as social cohesion.
However, these effects are only half of the story. Argentina’s schools did promote forms
of educational and social equality and mobility, as well as the reproduction of social and
economic inequalities based on the provision of different kinds of education based on
students’ social class, ethnicity, gender, and religious beliefs (Puiggrós, 1990; 1992).
Second, the State should intervene, identify, and also create “modern sectors.” In general
terms, those modern sectors are identified with creation of commercial and industrial
enterprises as the engines which will solve the economic and political “structural”
problems. But it is also important to mention the need to discipline the population, in the
sense of educating modern, literate, and economically consumering citizens. In that
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sense, the national, lay, public, and free school system had to lead the cultural aspects of
the modernization program.
Between the 1930s and 1960s, the Argentinean State played an important role in such a
selective process, mainly by leading the process called “import-substitution
industrialization.” The powerful role played by the State was a response to social
demands, and it resulted in higher levels of productivity and almost full employment.
Hence, the successive governments (particularly the Peronist regime of 1945-55) were
important players, providing vast sectors of the population with social benefits. Those
actions were part of a tacit agreement among the most powerful political, economic, and
cultural forces in the country. Under the aegis of this tacit agreement, the Argentinean
Welfare State was developed (Tironi & Lagos, 1991; Gerchunoff & Torre, 1992).
Nevertheless, this modernization model did not last long in Latin America and its
weaknesses became most evident and explosive during the 1979 oil crisis and the 1982
debt crisis. During these periods, international interest rates rose dramatically and
regional governments could not afford their debt payments. These stressful economic
changes, along with the phenomenon of authoritarian regimes, led to the general
characterization of this period as the “Lost Decade” of Latin America. (Note 1)
The financial crisis of the 1980s, the lack of social and political effectiveness of many of
the dictatorial regimes in the region, coupled with the political resistance against the
dictatorships are among the most important influences affecting the emerging processes
of democratization. Undoubtedly, Latin American societies welcomed the
re-establishment of governments elected by democratic procedures. However, these
governments found that among the legacies of decades of authoritarian rule, the
structures, power, and particularly, the legitimacy and perception about the power of the
Latin American states has been weakened. 
During the 1980s, the region witnessed a cycle of inflation, hyperinflation, and recession
of a severity never before experienced. Faced with rising international interest rates,
Latin American countries found it increasingly difficult to meet their debt repayment
schedules. As part of the re-negotiation of their debts, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank pressured regional governments into adopting
structural-adjustment policies to address balance of payment difficulties and fiscal
deficits. It is difficult to understand these processes without a parallel analysis of the
origins and purposes of the external and internal debt. In the Argentinean case, it must
not be forgotten that an authoritarian and corrupt government (1976-1983) was the main
actor in the generation of such a fiscal burden. Similar observations can be made about
several private groups that increased their debts, only to have them later nationalized and
transfered to the society as a whole (Aspiazu, 1985). The example of Argentina clearly
illustrates the complexity and multiplicity of factors interacting in the processes of
democratization and modernization.
Doubtless, the early 1980s were crucial in Argentina. The financial crisis, the Malvinas
(Falklands) War, increased pressure from domestic and international human rights
organizations, increased activism by labor unions, and a vast spectrum of social
movements accelerated the rapid deterioration of the military regime. The process of
democratic transition, as well as changes prompted by internationally induced
structural-adjustment policies initiated in these years are among the key elements to
examine and understand the changing role of the State in the emerging new model of
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modernization. Structural adjustment is usually described as a broad range of policies
recommended by the World Bank, the IMF, and other financial organizations. Although
the World Bank differentiates among stabilization, structural adjustment, and adjustment
policies, it acknowledges that the general use of these terms “is often imprecise and
inconsistent” (Samoff, 1991, p. 21).
Nevertheless, this model of stabilization and adjustment which emerged after the so-
called “Washington Consensus,” resulted in a number of conditions being imposed,
including the reduction of governmental expenditures, devaluations to promote exports,
reductions in import tariffs, and increased public and private savings. Key aims of this
model are a drastic reduction of the State sector, the liberalization of salaries and prices,
and the reorientation of industrial and agricultural production toward exports. The
overall purpose of this policy package is to reduce the size of fiscal deficits and public
expenditures, to drastically reduce inflation through strict monetary policies, and to
reduce exchange rates and tariffs. In the short term, structural adjustment policies rely on
exports as the engine of growth. To that extent, structural adjustment and subsequent
policies of economic stabilization seek to liberalize trade, to reduce any distortion in
price structures, to end any “protectionism” policies, and to facilitate free-market forces
in the economies (Blackmore, 2000)
By the end of the 1990s, the policies of economic and financial stabilization and
adjustment had also involved changes in the nation’s previous modernization model.
Clearly, and contrary to the “old” modernization approach, the “New Modernizers”
wanted the State to withdraw from the economic sphere. In the new model, the State was
mainly responsible for the structural problems.
During President Carlos Menem’s governments (1989-1999), Argentina experienced an
accelerated process of change and witnessed the implementation of a new model of
development. The “popular-market economy” was the name of the new model of
development. The most salient features of this model included the privatization of all
public enterprises, deregulation, opening the social security system to market
competition, and the decentralization of national health and education systems that had
been initiated by the dictatorship of 1976-1983.
Most of those changes were justified as the only possible solution to the economic
problems of the country because only they were attuned to the worldwide process of
globalization. In this case “globalization”, was equated with “modernization” and
implied the acceptance of the expansion of transnational capital, the supra-national
character of productive decision making, the trend toward homogenization of
information and cultural consumption, and the connecting of geographically and
culturally distant places in such a way that local events are shaped, as well as influenced,
by events occurring in remote places.
In addition to these economic measures, it should be noted again that the problem of
achieving the “right amount of social order” was a key element of this discourse of
modernity. The most important policy—in an attempt to promote internal peace and
consensus—was the political pardoning of the commanders from the last dictatorship
who were found guilty of crimes. However, this measure did little to solve real problems
or to “put the past behind us” as repeatedly suggested by President Menem. (Note 2)
The macro-economic indicators have changed and according to external observers they
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have improved (The Economist, 2000). However, with unemployment at approximately
15%, it is not an exaggeration to say that poverty and worsening living conditions are the
everyday reality for a growing number of people in Argentina. There is ample evidence
that Argentina’s basic welfare indicators have fallen: in 1974 only 3% of the population
was under the poverty line, and by 1990 after two hyperinflationary crises, the
percentage rose to almost 60%. In the province of Buenos Aires, the largest and richest
state in Argentina, the official percentage of households under the poverty line increased
to 73% during the 1990s (INDEC, 1999). By the same token, other social sectors in
Argentina enjoy the benefits of the application of policies of “liberalization” which give
them access to the latest world-market technology and to the consumption of fashionable
goods. The simultaneous increase of wealth for a few and the expansion of poverty for
many are the expression of the striking economic segmentation and its parallel process
of social polarization of the country.
Important transformations existed not only in the economy but also in the education
sector. The “new modernization” discourse developed a strong educational tone,
stressing the importance of higher levels of educational efficiency, and quality through
school decentralization, autonomy, increased rigor, discipline, efficiency, efficacy,
accountability, and higher levels of private sector participation in the delivery of
educational services (Gentilli, 1994). Section IV below, after a brief presentation of the
methods used for data collection (Section III), will explore the reactions, ideas and
responses of principal, teachers and students in private and public secondary schools to
the new modernization discourse.
III. Notes on Data Collection
The data for this research were gathered during two three-month periods and through
school observations, interviews, and four focus groups with secondary education
students. A series of open-ended interviews was conducted with 15 students and five
teachers from two secondary private schools, and with 10 students and five teachers
from one public secondary school. To protect the anonymity of all the participants in this
study all names and locations are pseudonymous.
The selection of these three schools was based on geographical proximity and
similarities in student population. The three schools are co-ed, medium in size, and to
some extent serve a population of similar social and economic characteristics, academic
orientation, and prestige. In other words, teachers, administrators, and parents have a
more or less consistent opinion indicating that these three institutions are “different but
they are good schools.” The schools are located in a 20-block area (2.0 Sq. Km), within
the same neighborhood in the city of Buenos Aires. This neighborhood is considered
typically middle class, with a mix of residential and commercial areas.
It should be noted that—even though this limits even more the results of this
research—none of the two private schools belonged to a religious order or
denomination. In Argentina most private schools belong or are supported by religious
institutions. This decision was made to produce as many similarities as possible among
the students and teachers in the three institutions.
In addition to the activities carried out within the secondary schools, the researcher
interviewed the director of the National Institute for Supervising Private Education, the
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director of the Chamber of Private Owners of Schools, researchers and technicians of the
National Ministry of Education who were working in the area of private education, and
researchers and professors in the University of Buenos Aires and the University of
Luján. General data such as educational financial policies, changes that occurred in the
policies for public subsidies, enrollment, student achievement, and general evaluation
about private education were obtained at the National Institute of Private Teaching
(SNEP) and the National Ministry of Education. Finally, a large collection of articles
published in newspapers (La Nacion, Clarin, La Prensa, and Pagina 12) and specialized 
Argentinean journals (Revista Argentina de Educación, Educoo, Propuesta Educativa,
andCuadernos del CIE) was collected. 
IV. In Search of Educational Modernity
An anecdote illustrates some of the pivotal points in which the search for “educational
modernity” was articulated during the period under study. What follows are transcribed
notes from the researcher’s field-work:
May 1993: visit to the ministry of education for interviews. I have to wait
for the “customary” 30 minutes. I asked one of the secretaries for any copies
of the ministry’s advertising material to be distributed in secondary schools.
I expect that the answer will be “there is nothing,” or at least nothing
interesting, but I’m gladly surprised. The secretary provides me with a
nicely designed package. The main material is a tabloid format of the newly
approved Federal Law of Education, it is clearly printed and the text is
presented in a “reader-friendly” layout.
Despite the content of this measure, the initial reaction of this researcher
was: “This is a change from the past. At least now the government
publicizes the laws it passes.” Yet, I was astonished to find and read a large
advertisement on the back cover which promoted not the contents of the
law, nor the achievements of the federal government but the ideas of the
Argentinean Chamber of Textbooks’ Publishers. This chamber, a powerful
for- profit organization, was using the back cover of the text of a national
law, distributed by the federal government in schools, universities, libraries
and community organizations to promote the free choice of books by
teachers. Despite the novelty of the two intertwined procedures (i.e.,
massive publicity of the government actions in education and the somewhat
strange media chosen by textbook publishers for their promotion), the
pamphlet was intriguing. With its saturated text, it was not clear whether the
government was endorsing the Chamber or the other way around.
These notes contain some of the tensions developed in the process of searching for a
new model of educational modernization in the Argentina of the 1990s. As noted before,
broadly speaking during the period 1985-1999, the goals of the “new modernization”
discourse in education were promoted under the rubrics of “decentralization programs”
and “quality improvement programs” in which the use of national evaluation programs
was a key aspect. This “new educational modernization” was emphatically reaffirmed by
the approval of two major legislative initiatives.
The first such initiative occurred in 1992 when the federal government developed a
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process of decentralization by which it delegated the responsibility of secondary-school
management (among other social services) to the provincial states. This process of
decentralization was also presented as part of the needed modernization of the structures
of government by creating a new smaller and leaner state. This program was publicized
and presented to local and international audiences with the slogan, “A Ministry without
schools.”
At first glance, through this transference the federal government, would transfer power
by not controlling the administration of secondary schools and instead adopting a
“managing” role. Nevertheless, as Dussel, Birgin and Tiramonti (in press) observed, the
new ministry of education:
[H]as retained responsibility for four major areas: set of common contents,
evaluation of outcomes, compensatory programs, and in-service teacher
training. It also coordinates the activities of the provincial administrations
through a special Committee, and monopolizes the negotiation and
administration of foreign loans from multi-lateral financial institutions.
Through all these measures, the Ministry has provoked a powerful
re-centralization of the system, perhaps even greater than when it directly
administered the schools. (p. 24)
There is a general consensus among researchers that the decentralization process
initiated in 1992 parallels the administrative decentralization of elementary education
undertaken by the military dictatorship of 1978 (see Rhoten, 1999 for a complete
account of this process). The main rationale for both decentralization programs was
related to fiscal crisis more than to the transfer of pedagogical or political
decision-making (Hanson, 1994; Rhoten, 1999).
It is relevant to quote Hanson’s account of how the decentralization process took place:
“The transfer of the secondary schools was a surprise move. The first notification that
the attempt would be made came when the national budget was produced and
distributed. The budget had deleted its historic financial support for secondary
education. The outcry was so intense that the central government was almost obligated
to delay the transfer while it developed a justification, held public debate, and passed a
law. Few doubted that the results of the public debate would change the outcome, and it
did not.” (Hanson, 1994, p. 4)
The second initiative was the sanction of the Federal Law of Education, the major legal
education reform since the original Education Law of 1884 (which organized elementary
education in Argentina). The new law introduced changes in the following areas:
The structure of the academic system: Previously, elementary school was mandatory
for 7 years and secondary education required 5 years for completion (not mandatory).
With the new law there is an extension of mandatory education from 7 to 10 years
divided into an initial level (one year), and three levels of general basic education (three
years each). The final level, denominated Polymodal Education, requires three years and
it is the only one which is not mandatory for every child.
The curricular standards: The Law establishes the criteria for the development of the
minimum requirements for each curricular area and each level, including teacher
education. These curricular standards known as CBC (Currricular Basic Contents) were
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developed by content specialists in consultation with different corporate sectors.
Teachers’ Professional Development: A national network of teacher professional
development activities to train school personnel. The network seeks the best offers for
teacher training from different providers (public and private universities and other
educational organizations). The training must respond to the Currricular Basic Contents
developed for teacher certification.
Development and implementation of a national system of assessment: The national
ministry of education is required to develop, administer and assess the results of national
evaluation instruments. Samples of students in designated grades (3rd, 6th, 7th and 12th) 
have to be evaluated in mathematics, language, social and natural sciences. The results
of such evaluations must be public. Beginning in 1997 all students in 12th grade in both 
public and private schools must take the national evaluation test and it is expected that
by 2001, this will be a graduation requirement.
The economic-financial rationale and pro-private overtones of both laws were widely
recognized in the media and within academic circles. Scholars from very different
academic traditions and technicians and experts from private corporations such as
ADEBA, FIEL, IDEA, agreed that the new Federal law did not substantially change the
situation of the public sector but did include the old symbolic claims of the private
sector. As a research team of professors at the University of Buenos Aires pointed out:
First of all, it is possible to say that the private education sector has
benefited from the implementation of this new law, which incorporated
many of their previous claims, such as: a) the law introduces the
terminology that this sector uses to classify the distinct types of educational
services, for example the use of the term “public” without regard for the
type of administration. Thus, private-management or state management can
both be referred to as “public.” b) The interests of this sector are reflected in
the role of the state in the provision of educational services. These services
reflect: 1) the primacy of the freedom of teaching as one of the guiding
principles of educational policies, 2) the explicit establishment of the
private sector’s rights to participate in educational planning, 3) the right of
the private sector to receive “financial support” and not “subsidies,” and 4)
the inclusion of religion as an important aspect of the goals of the school
system and development of the “person” (Nosiglia & Marquina, 1993, p.
89).
While debate of the law was taking place, the government was firmly committed to the
implementation of a series of so-called “quality and accountability measures.” The
administration of president Carlos Saúl Menem, following recommendations made by
the World Bank (Kugler, 1991) encouraged provincial administrations to evaluate their
educational systems, and later implemented a general system of evaluating the quality of
education --the “SINEC.” It is important to clarify that when international financial
organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund recommend
any given policy, it usually implies that loans or financial assistance are contingent on
the application of such recommendation. The government of the province of Mendoza
undertook the first attempt during the last months of 1992, followed by a nation-wide
evaluation.
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In all of these quality evaluations (Mendoza, SINEC National, and other smaller
evaluations), the results were quite discouraging, and the national ministry of education
did not want to publicize the results. On average, around 40% of all the students
evaluated were unable to solve simple mathematical and language-related problems (
Ministerio de Cultura y Educación, 1998).
More importantly, as the data in Table 1, 2 and 3 illustrate (especially given the
objectives of this research) students in both public and private schools performed poorly.
In addition, even though private schools scored better than public schools, the difference
in performance between students at urban private and public institutions was not as
important as the researchers and the public had predicted. It is also interesting to see in
Tables 2 and 3 that public institutions are improving faster and, thus, closing the gap
with the private schools. 
Table 1
Comparative performance of public and private secondary schools
in the SINEC evaluations (1994-1997)
Year Public Schools Private Schools
1994 56.46 65.15 
1995 50.61 60.72 
1996 50.61 60.72 
1997 57.52 66.33 
Source: Llach, J. J., Montoya S., and Roldán, F. Educación Para Todos, Córdoba,
IREAL, 1999. 
Table 2
Comparative Performance of 7th Grade Achievement Scores
in Language of Public (Rural and Urban) 
and Private (Urban) Secondary Schools in the SINEC Evaluations
(Selected Years 1993-1997)
School Modality
Language 
Difference 93-97
1993 1997 
Urban Public Schools 50.30 58.27 7.97 
Rural Public Schools 41.87 50.26 8.39 
Urban Private Schools 63.63 69.28 5.65 
Source: Argentina Ministerio de Cultura y Educación (1998)
Table 3
Comparative Performance of 7th Grade Achievement Scores
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in Mathematics of Public (Rural and Urban) 
and Private (Urban) Secondary Schools in the SINEC Evaluations
(Selected Years 1993-1997)
School Modality
Mathematics 
Difference 93-97
1993 1997 
Urban Public Schools 51.05 53.18 2.13 
Rural Public Schools 40.74 44.51 3.77 
Urban Private Schools 64.95 63.33 -1.62 
Source: Argentina Ministerio de Cultura y Educación (1998)
The initial outcry about the results was followed by a great media battle over whom to
blame. Teacher unions were angry and were prepared to fight any attempt to scapegoat
their members. The Ministry of Education was unable to explain the results, the causes,
and future steps. The private sector declined to take a unified position and did not give
much credence to the evaluations. Rather, it seemed each sector and each school was
reaffirming its own institutional identity and defending its own merits.
In Argentina, the participation of the private sector in secondary education is quite
important and enrollment in private schools makes up almost one third of the total
(World Bank, 1995). The historical development of the private sector peaked during the
early 1970s and has decreased since that time. Table 4 describes the situation.
Table 4
Secondary Education Private Enrollment for Selected Years
(Percentage of Total Secondary Education Students)
Year Enrollment 
Percentage 
1960   23.4 %
1970   33.1 %
1980   30.7 %
1992   28.1 %
1998   28.0 %
Source: Argentina Ministerio de Cultura y Educación (1998)
Since 1970, enrollment in private secondary schools has stagnated, yet the number of
schools has increased in certain districts. In the more affluent areas of the country, the
private sector covers almost 40% of the total enrollment. For instance, in Buenos Aires
the public schools make up 29.4% of the institutions with 53.6% of the total enrollment,
while the private sector has 70.6% of the institutions and 46.3% of the students. It is
important to note that within the private sector, the vast majority of the schools (61%)
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are regulated by the Catholic Church (Beccaria & Riquelme, 1986). The registered
decrease in the percentage of students enrolled in private schools, accompanied by the
increase in the number of private schools, could be interpreted as the process of
“elitization” in which these schools are competing for the upper strata of the population.
The above notes have provided contextual information. What follows are data gathered
in interviews with principals, parents, students, teachers and a consultant for private
schools.
The Principals
The interviews with the principals of the three schools revealed two main trends. The
first trend refers to the importance of the funding role of the federal government in
relation to the perception of the “private school advantage.” The second trend was a
shared sense of uneasiness among the three principals about the implementation of
federally mandated measures of evaluation.
The first trend requires some background information. What distinguishes the case of
private schools in Argentina, compared with similar institutions in the USA is that the
great majority of these private schools (secular and non-secular) receive public subsidies
to pay teachers’ salaries. These subsidies can vary from 20% to 100%. In short,
Argentina’s federal government is the largest source of educational financial resources in
both the public and private sector. Such financial support was seen as a point of conflict
by many of the professionals interviewed in this study. For those working in public
schools, it was seen as an unfair advantage given to the private schools and the reason of
their presumed superior performance. The principal of the public school (thereafter PS)
observed in this study, commented as follows:
Principal Public School PS: It is scandalous that the government spends
money in (name of private school 1 and name of private school 2) and then
my supervisor tells me that there is no money for repairing the plumbing of
my school. That is another proof of the lack of commitment to public
schools…. See, … if you go to a private school you pay for all the
computers and balls (in reference to sporting equipment) and all the other
nice stuff, then the government pays the salaries of the teachers, How can
you compare? It is unfair, I know it is unfair, and everybody knows it is
unfair.
For both principals in the private schools, (thereafter Mountain-view and Lake-view) the
public subsidies were seen as fair and needed to survive the financial crisis.
Private School Mountain- View principal: The subsidies are important,
without them we cannot survive … and… the government should not make
distinctions between schools, kids are kids, all of them students. We are
doing a public service because we are educators. At least now that is
recognized (in reference to the new Law of Education). Besides, private
schools save public money because educating a kid in a private school is
cheaper for the state than educating the same kid in a public school.
During the period 1995-1998 the school of principal of Mountain-view saw a small
decrease in the number of enrolled students. The main explanation for the decrease was
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an increase in the costs of school fees and the national economic crisis. In this regard it
is interesting to note the opinion of an educational consultant working in several private
schools, about private schools’ strategies for increasing enrolment.
Question: In your opinion, is the private sector trying to reach other social
sectors, the lower middle class for instance?
Private Schools Consultant: I do not see any interest in reaching the lower
middle class, at least in the immediate future. Today’s school fees, despite
the difference of prices that private institutions are offering, are very high
and many parents find it difficult to pay tuition and fees. Moreover, despite
the fact that everybody wants a good education it doesn’t mean that
everybody wants to pay for that. In addition, the country is full of engineers
that drive taxis, mathematicians in drugstores, and so on. That is sending a
clear message. Sometimes a good education doesn’t pay.
This consultant reflection pointed out to the sad reality of the absolute imperfection of
Argentina’s educational market. This expert describes some of the real problems and
difficulties that—as will be presented later—other respondents also noted; the conflicted
relationships between schooling and the job market in Argentina. The notion that the
relationship between education and the economy is always a simple case of human
capital enhancement, with the market always solving the equation in positive terms, does
not readily apply in Argentina. In a nation where unemployment remains in two digits
after a decade of structural adjustment programs and a good deal of highly educated
workers do not find jobs that match their skills, it is understandable the skepticism of
teachers and students alike about the value of education.
In light of the opinion of the private schools’ consultant it is not surprising, then that the
principal of Mountain-view did not have or did not want to share his plans for the future
in terms of a new strategy to reach new sectors of the population. However, the
Mountain-View’s principal stated that one of his goals was to incorporate more and
better students “regardless of economic origins, because the school has more space and
the public schools are overcrowded.”
In the case of the principal of Lake-View school the subsidy was also seen as needed but
with the addition of representing an instrument of control by the federal government.
Private School Lake-View principal: I would love to get ride of the
subsidies, but we can’t. No subsidies, no [private] school.
Question: What would be the advantage of not receiving subsidies?
Lake-View principal: Some schools are trying that. The first advantage is
that there is no more regulation of what your fee should be, and from an
investment perspective, if you could increase the price of your service, the
margin of profit increases. But it is very complicated and I am not interested
in the money making aspect, … I am an educator. But if the government
does not subsidize the school, the power, the inspectors, the tests, will be,
how can I say, … less threatening, and we could make more changes, and
faster.
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Despite the difference of opinion about the role of the state subsidies, the principals of
the three schools expressed similar perceptions about the private schools ability to adapt
to situations defined as critical. Critical situations were described as the economical and
political crises that have affected Argentina’s daily life, such as the hyperinflation (1989-
91), military uprisings (1987–89), civil riots (1989), civil attack to a military fort (1989),
and the chronic unemployment of the late 1990s. For example, answering a question
about innovations in curriculum, the principal of one of the private schools stated:
Mountain-View principal: You know, in the private schools it is easier to
find room for innovations, and in Argentina you always have to be ready for
sudden changes and disasters.
When the first part of the fieldwork for this study was undertaken, the debate about
education (or the crisis of education) was raging. Everyone was eager to express an
opinion about the results of the Mendoza’s evaluation or the recurring comments by
education experts which appeared in the media. This environment provided an ideal
opportunity for conducting this research. The questions seemed to be timely and gave
interviewees an opportunity to express their opinions. The principals of one of the
private schools and the public school principal used an almost identical argument when
asked their opinions about the evaluations. The principal of Mountain-View reported the
following
Question: How do you evaluate the performance of private schools in
general given the results of the evaluation of the quality of education by
Mendoza and other similar endeavors?
Mountain-View principal: The important thing here is to recognize that our
school is doing the work. It is teaching . . . something you can’t say about
the public schools. You know, every other day teachers are on strike.
Question: How do you explain that on average the scores of students in
private schools and public ones are not very different?
Mountain-View principal: Well the problem is the test and its evaluators.
The tests were prepared by people who don’t know how we [private sector]
operate and that is the main reason.
Similarly, the principal of the public secondary school expressed discomfort when asked
about the national system of evaluation:
Question: What do you think about the quality of education evaluations?
Public School principal: I don’t like the use of these tests; it is all
political…we need to ask why are they [the government] implementing
these evaluations, They are trying to prove that public schools are doing a
bad job. Besides, I’m sure that those who are preparing the evaluations have
never visited a classroom. Try to teach math to 35 students and after that we
can talk about evaluations.
As these testimonies indicate, the principals in the private and public schools shared
concerns about the national system of evaluation, and also shared the belief (for different
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reasons, though) about the private schools’ advantages. It is important to emphasize that
this belief was maintained even after the results of the national evaluations of quality
showed that urban private and public schools have not performed in significantly
different manners.
The idea that private schools have more flexibility than public schools o change or adapt
the academic curricula than public ones was difficult to asses. Academic performance
was a very important consideration for the three principals, and they all emphasized
similar solutions for improving the performance of their schools, namely: better teacher
preparation, updated educational materials (computers and textbooks), and better
discipline in schools.
The three principals were very concerned with security and discipline as a way of
improving the conditions in which the students learn. It is important to note that during
the field-work, principals, teachers and students in the three schools did not report
extraordinary disciplinary problems. Nevertheless, in many interviews particularly with
the adults, the idea of schools being unsafe places seems to have replaced past, more
romantic visions of Argentinean schools as the “second home,” sacred places for
learning.
It is very likely that the concern with discipline expressed by the principals was a
response to a few violent situations that occurred in public and private secondary schools
during the period 1989-1998, and which were prominently displayed in the media. Yet,
the lack of any systematic study tracking the rise or decline of violence in schools does
not permit drawing any firm conclusion. Nevertheless, the rise of levels of poverty
associated with high levels of unemployment, and the rising statistics for street crime in
general may support the perceptions that the whole society is less safe, including
schools.
The Teachers
The interviews with teachers confirmed the trend about the “private school advantage”
but also revealed discomfort with the educational system in general. Yet the reasons for
the better performance of the private schools were not conclusive. All the teachers
interviewed indicated that private schools have better programs or have advantages over
public schools in creating better academic environments. However, when the questions
searched for the main differences in curriculum development, evaluation, discipline
programs, and incentives, teachers in both public and private schools had difficulties in
pointing out specific modalities, beyond private schools’ better facilities.
Teresa P., a female teacher, has been teaching history in private and public schools for
more than five years and was teaching at Mountain-View when she was interviewed.
When the issue of the quality-of-education evaluations was raised, her response was
evasive. She did not know or did not want to take a clear position regarding that topic.
For that reason, the questions focused on other differences between public and private
institutions: 
Question: Where do you feel better? At the public or at the private school?
Teresa P.: Nowhere; I have the same problems, the place doesn’t matter, the
same low salaries, the same country, the same old-fashioned curriculum, the
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same lack of good supervision and the same general indifference about our
work.
Question: Can you think about any difference?
Teresa P.: In the bathroom [laughing] and that is serious! I mean the lack of
investment that you have at the national [public] school is disgusting,
horrific and the first place that you notice that is in the bathrooms. In that
regard at St. X [a Catholic private school] and Mountain-View that is
always better and of course there [private schools] we have chalk and an
eraser in each classroom, VCR and that kind of stuff. At the national public
school we have to bring our own chalk, it is a shame! For the rest I think we
need a general change, not only talking about schools, we need general
changes in the country.
The testimony of Teresa P. exemplified a common pattern expressed by several teachers
during the course of this research. The idea that education is not an isolated problem was
frequently mentioned by teachers. This trend, which this research has termed “society
first,” was equally salient for teachers in public or private schools, and it can be
summarized as follows: educational problems are dependent on social problems and
thus, educational solutions require country-wide extra- school, social changes.
A possible explanation of the “society first” trend can be found in the severity of the
country’s financial and social crises, which were severely felt by teachers. In the words
of Emilio Tenti, a noted Argentinean researcher:
There is a national trend of a prolonged decline in the real salaries of
teachers from the mid-1970s to the beginning of the 1990s. The best years
with regard to salary were during the first half of the 1980s, and a loss in the
relative position of teachers’ salary compared to that of the salaries obtained
by the average salaried workers in the formal sector of the economy has
occurred. (1999, p. 270)
In the late 1990s, teachers were earning a third less than an average worker in the formal
economic system (Tenti, 1999), and in most cases they held several part-time school
jobs (a condition popularly known as “Taxi-Teachers”). Nonetheless, the precarious
conditions of the teaching profession in general and the acutely critical circumstances of
the mid 1990s did not prevent or protect teachers from harsh criticism (especially those
working in public schools).
Teachers were blamed for declines in student achievement and lack of consideration
about students’ welfare (due to their political efforts –a series of strikes, public
demonstrations. For almost three years the teachers union held a political protest called
the Carpa Blanca, (the white tent). The “white tent” was erected in front of the national
legislature, and hosted teachers and activists on hunger strikes. This particular form of
protest was first condemned, but later received more popular support.
It is in this context that the relationships between teachers and parents and teachers with
administrators and educational authorities grew more tense. To some extent the teaching
profession entered into a state of acute crisis. It is difficult to determine the extent of this
crisis, but the decline of enrolment in teacher education programs, and reports pointing
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out that more than 40% of teachers answered that they would choose another profession
are clear indicators of its seriousness. (Birgin and Braslavsky, 1995; Fischman, 2000)
Returning to the central focus of this research, the comparison of the perceptions
between secondary public and private schools, as noted before, teachers also supported
the notion of the “private school advantage” as illustrated by the following extended
testimony Carlos P. a mathematics male teacher who was working at Lake-View, and
who had previous experience at public schools reflected on his career:
Carlos P. (Lake-View): I started my career full of energy! I felt that teaching
was my mission, my goal in life. My first year I was lucky, I got three
temporary positions at three large public schools, 12 hours in each. But one
was in [the neighborhood of] Floresta, the other in [the neighborhood of]
Devoto and the last one, my favorite in [the neighborhood of] Belgrano.
After four years I ran out of energy, more than three hundred students, you
know the time I needed to evaluate tests and homework. It was impossible. I
was tired of being a “taxi-teacher.” And the money that you spend traveling!
And the time! And the students. It was too much. Well, I went to
MiddleTown [a large private school]. I started with 20 hours and then I got
five more hours as a coordinator. It was less money but I negotiated and got
more hours in one place. No more traveling, no more taxis. That is better in
the private school.
Question: Anything else?
Carlos P.: Oh yeah! But it is not what you are thinking about! At Lake-View
you have someone—the principal and the owner—you can discuss and
negotiate with them—not money—because that is fixed, but everything
else. The other element, perhaps the most important one is the pressure of
parents on the kids. They [parents] are spending a lot of money and they
don’t want the kids joking around. It doesn’t necessarily imply that those
upper-middle class kids are better-motivated or better students [than
students at public schools] but they sometimes behave as consumers and ask
for good service. However, another thing is what they [students] think is a
good service.
Question: What do you mean?
Carlos P.: Students, not all of them, but some, sometimes mistake the fact
that they are paying for a service and therefore they assume that paying is
equal to getting good grades or having the right to not do homework. That
kind of thing. It is funny how sometimes they ask for grades! I paid and I
deserve, like buying a CD! 
Question: Do you consider that as a challenge or that this kind of pressure
makes you change your teaching style from what you used to do at the
public schools?
T.2PrII: Oh no! At the public school you have something similar, teenagers
are always challenging us, but the reasons are different. How can I explain
this? It is like, well, at the private school some students behave like
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customers buying services and at the National [public school] some
students, those who are more politicized, they ask for their rights. It is like .
. . I know, they always start with “We have the right, we deserve this or that
because we are citizens.” Well in both cases I feel like the ham of the
sandwich.
This teacher’s testimony captures several key questions for this research. Is it possible to
frame public and private schooling as the expression of competence between citizen
rights and consumer rights? Do we have any chance of improving education without
changing the working conditions of thousands of “taxi-teachers”? Given the results of
the national evaluation tests: What is the importance of the structural conditions of
secondary schools? What are the key material conditions that matter in schools? Better
salaries? More VCRs? Good bathrooms? Granted all the above are important conditions;
teachers deserve to be working in environments in which their main worries should
revolve around learning and not VCRs or bathrooms.
Finally, in the interviews with teachers it is difficult to asses any significant difference in
terms of private school teachers enjoying more autonomy or a more responsive
environment to their professional or their students’ needs due to parents or market
pressures. What Glass (1997) indicated was the case of the United States is also
applicable in the case of these schools in Argentina:
Autonomy is an issue that does not clearly distinguish public from private
education. The freedom teachers and administrators feel and the constraints
they experience are complex. Many of the constraints experienced by public
and private high school administrators and teachers are similar. Both sectors
must work within the limits of a set of prescribed laws. They are equally
subject to pressures resulting from limited funds. Perceptions of autonomy
are individual matters, often experienced within a range of accepted
constraints.(Glass, 1997) 
The Students
The findings from focus groups and interviews with students from public and private
schools revealed three main trends: a) a sense that their school experiences are not very
pleasant, or very rich in terms of learning, b) the social group “teacher” deserves
solidarity, but the teachers working at their schools less so; and c) private schools are
better than public ones.
As in the case of the principals, a similar strong belief was reported about the private
school advantage by students in both public and private schools. What should be noted
is that for the students the sense of competition between the two systems was very
strong. However, it was difficult for the students to indicate what were the specific bases
that sustain the notion that private schools outperformed public schools. In some cases,
students from private schools pointed to pressures from their parents (over them and the
school) as the main justification; in other cases, students identified loosely defined
“higher academic expectations.” Students in public schools indicated the access to better
buildings and parents’ pressures. Yet, at the same time most students (in both public and
private schools) indicated that they were not satisfied with their schooling experience.
One female student asserted:
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Sudent.1-Lake-View: my parents are always reminding me how much my
school costs, and I tell them that given the [sic] ‘crap’ my teachers teach,
they should save the money.
A male student in his last year of secondary public school reflected about his experience
in the following terms:
Student.2-Public School: If you look around this school, you will see how
depressing it is to be here. Teachers are tired, some are bored, but for the
most part they are tired, and sometimes we don’t help. I remember at the
beginning when one of the teachers was absent or during the strikes we got
really happy, it was fun, more free hours, and time to fool around. But lately
it all seems a big waste of time. In some classes I cannot remember learning
anything. I want to go the university but I’m afraid I’m not ready.
When questioned about possible differences between students in private and public
schools Student.2 indicated that:
Student.2-Public School: If I have to judge from my friends that go to the
private school, I think that they are as ignorant as I am…but, I don’t know, I
guess that they are better prepared … I don’t know, but I think so, they are
better prepared.
The comments of Student.2 are illustrative of a strong tendency among the students.
They do not know why, but the belief about the superiority of private schools is rather
solid. However, it should be noted that students as a social group had a very definite
tendency to present bold opinions. 
The testimonies of Student1 and Student2 are clear examples of the disappointment with
schooling, which in some cases was extended to the society and the government. When
students pointed out their frustration with the government and society, they usually
expressed an uneasy sense of solidarity with teachers. In other words, teachers in general
were seen as “victims” of unfair systems, but their particular teachers were in many
cases harshly evaluated, or even mocked. This last tendency was equally strong among
students from both public and private schools. When asked about a recent demonstration
and a possible strike by teachers, Student.3 gave total support. But a few minutes later
when asked about his opinion of the teachers at his school, he replaced solidarity with
mockery.
Student.3-Public School: I support teachers demands for better salaries, no
doubt that the government lies all the time… there should be money about
education… everybody says that education is the future, the priority and all
that, but I think they are lying, they [government officials] are not
committed…[Student.3- Public School continues criticizing the
government]
Question: Do you think that your teachers are going to participate in the
protests? 
Student.3-Public School: My teachers? No, … most of them are scared and
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old- fashioned. They complain all the time, but sometimes I think that they
are here because they are a bunch of losers, well they are a bunch of losers.
The notion that teaching is a noble profession—but somehow the real teachers working
at real schools do not deserve much respect—was equally prominent among private
education students. During a focus group with 10 students from the private school
Lake-View, 8 out of 10 were very supportive of teachers striking for better salaries.
Nevertheless, when asked the same question about the teachers at their school
participating in a future strike, one of the participants (female student in 4th year at 
Lake- View) expressed these opinions:
Student.4-Lake-View: No, teachers here are teachers.
Question: What do you mean by “teachers are teachers”?
Student.4-Lake-View: … They don’t want to risk anything, they do
everything the principal tells them to do, or follow the textbook, they are …
boring, really boring … everything is always the same… .
Student.4-Lake-View: Yes, she is totally right, there are days we spend as
much time sleeping in class as copying idiotic stuff.
The previous testimonies are consistent in showing dissatisfaction with schooling and
authorities in general. During this research, in only one instance did students point to
their own of responsibility in their own schooling when they recognize that cheating is a
very common practice. During the first part of one focus group with 9 students from two
secondary schools (5 from the public and 4 from Mountain-View private school) most
participants agreed with the notion that “private schools are better, than public ones,” or
as one of the students from the public school emphatically stated “It is a fact! If you can
choose, you go to the private.” None of the other students seemed to disagree. However,
almost at the end of the focus group and when questioned about the quality of education
in general in light of the results of the SINEC evaluations, two students (one form each
school) produced the following dialogue which drew the enthusiastic support of the
other participants:
Student.5-Public School: It couldn’t be different, we share the same
teachers!
Sudent.6-Mountain-View: Yeah! Mr. Pepe teaches the same nonsense here
[private school] and there [public school] and the same over and over. My
brother was his student more than seven years ago and he can repeat Pepe’s
lesson on civics word by word. He [Mr. Pepe] is like a tape recorder!
Student.5-Public School: Besides, you know, we are experts!
Question: What do you mean?
Student.5-Public School: You know, cheating is very common; I think that
when we finish school they should give us another diploma with the title,
“Master Cheaters.” (Note 3)
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To sum up this section, students from public and private schools consistently supported
the notion of the private school advantage, but were not very clear in their reasons for
such belief. They were also able to point to similar levels of dissatisfaction with their
schools. It is also important to mention that notwithstanding the expressed
dissatisfaction with their schooling, for the most part, students were not against teachers
in general. However the sympathy and solidarity with the abstraction “teacher” were not
felt for the teachers from their own schools. This last tendency can be understood as a
way of compensating for the sense of frustration that some students feel about their
school experiences.
V. Conclusions 
This research was conducted to assess the extent of curricular and management changes
in two private and one public secondary schools in the city of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
The main goal was to explore the perception of local actors (principals, teachers, and
students) of what was termed the “new modernization discourse in education.”
It is important to restate that this study did not intend to provide generalizable
conclusions valid for all contexts and situations, nor to provide a single unifying
narrative that explains the situation of all private and public secondary schools in
Argentina. Rather it aimed at offering some clues about the perception of changes by a
limited number of social actors and their understanding of how public and private
secondary schools operate in a particular context.
After reviewing all the evidence gathered, the presumed capability of private schools in
absorbing increasing numbers of students with higher levels of educational excellence
could not be assessed. Furthermore, there is no clear evidence showing significantly
important change in the population’s response to the promises of the private sector in
terms of enrolment and yet, there is a strong belief among students, teachers and
principals in the better performance of the private sector at all levels.
Besides supporting the “private school advantage” notion, both teachers and students in
these three schools showed high levels of dissapointment with the general status of
secondary education. Those levels were not directly related to the relative poor
performance of students in the national evaluation tests but with a system of education
which seems to offer few opportunities for self and social empowerment and to be
unrewarding for both teachers and students.
Contrary to what the “free-market” literature predicts, in the case of these three
secondary schools in Buenos Aires and based on the perspectives offered by this small
sample of students and teachers, it appears that private and public schools in the same
geographic area are offering similar curricular options and having similar results.
According to the marketization literature, this finding is somewhat surprising, because
private schools should be able to afford “alternative” programs, having more flexibility
and somewhat better working conditions for its teachers. Perhaps, the observed
similarity can be explained by two conditions: a) 85% of the teachers in the two private
schools were trained in public institutions, and b) the three schools are located in the
same neighborhood and serve students with similar social and economic backgrounds.
The findings of this study are also consistent with the results of Glass’s (1997) study
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about public and private schools in Arizona and Rothstein,, Carnoy, and Benveniste’s
(1999) study of public and private schools in California. In their study, Rothstein,
Carnoy, and Benveniste (1999) concluded that:
[T]he social, cultural, and economic backgrounds of the parents and the
community in which the school was located seemed to be the main
determinant of variation, much more so than a school’s public or private
character or, within the latter group, whether it was religious or secular.
Within these particular communities, the similarities between schools and
the problems they confronted overwhelmed the differences (1999, p. 75)
The three schools studied in Buenos Aires operated in a context in which their
pedagogical and administrative decisions were constrained by the emergence of a new
discourse about “educational modernization.” This discourse has assumed a clear
pro-private schools tone, and its defenders contend that it is both a response as well as
part of the conditions emerging from the process of globalization. In this discourse,
educational modernization is a by-product of globalization, and both developed
“naturally” as the only possible response to also “naturally” occurring situations.
Therefore, in this discourse the implementation of programs of structural adjustment,
legislative changes affecting the provision of educational services, and the strong
support of international financial agencies, mainstream media, the political
establishment and large sectors of the population for private education are presented as
the only possible alternatives to“naturally” occurring situations, and not part of large and
complex political and economical struggles.
The importance and influence of the current debate in Great Britain and the USA about
markets and choice in education and the international financial agencies’ role –which
Joel Samoff (1991) has aptly defined as the “Financial-Intellectual Complex”–in
tailoring the new modernization discourse in Argentina are two factors that should not
be underestimated. As noted before at the turn of the nineteenth century the nation -state
assumed the task of being the engine of capitalist modernization in Latin America. For
the enterprise of modernization, national, publicly funded school systems were
conceptualized as a key component. (Tedesco, 1989)
In the current globalized capitalism, the pressures to transform the models of
modernization, the role of the state, and the functions and extent of national systems of
“public” schools are greater than ever before. The phenomenon of globalization, with its
compression of time and space , (Castells, 1997), has created a new set of conditions,
some of which were severely felt in the Argentina of the 1980s and 1990s. The levels of
autonomy of the national state are under constant scrutiny because as Jill Blackmore
noted “Whereas the welfare state previously disciplined the market within its national
boundaries, in a globalized context the state is now being disciplined by the international
markets.” (2000, p. 335)
Under these disciplinary constraints the contemporary Latin American state can be best
characterized as a “conditioned capitalist state” (Fuller, 1991), which is not a less
interventionist state but one that is conditioned by supranational forces (including the
local elites connected to the transnational sector) constraining the national state’s ability
to operate within its national boundaries. In Argentina during the 1980s and 1990s given
the circumstances of semi-permanent political and financial crises, Argentina’s state as a
conditioned state had fewer possibilities for developing models of schooling which did
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not resemble the models developed and promoted by more powerful international
financial institutions. (Samoff, 1991)
Financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
respond to the policies of the governments of the richest, most industrialized countries in
the world (Robinson, 1999). In this scenario it is expected that the most likely
educational policies to be developed by conditioned capitalist countries will therefore,
resemble those educational policies developed in and favoring the continuous
accumulation of capital by the G-7 countries.
Established Western societies are no longer optimistic that the Welfare State
can effectively assist, or even understand, the problems facing working class
and low-income groups. Individualistic market rules and materialistic
preoccupation, earlier advanced by the classically liberal state, are gaining
supporters from a widening range of social classes which see less and less
meaning in centralized versions of the modern state. (Fuller, 1991, p. 141)
As the current North American debate over vouchers and choice initiatives shows, the
pro- market initiatives are gaining momentum. In addition, proposals by the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund calling for the privatization of schooling of the add
more pressure and conditions the options of Argentina’s public education system. When
one of the most recognizable World Bank experts in education proclaims that the best
way to solve the problems of public education is to “Privatize as much as you can”
(Psacharopoulos, 1990), there is no doubt that privatization has become a powerful
component of the new modernization discourse in education.
At this point, with the available evidence from this small research in Argentina, and the
international experience from countries such as Chile (Carnoy, 2000), New Zealand
(Lauder and Hughes, 1999), the USA (Glass, 1997; Rothstein, Carnoy, and Benveniste,
1999) and the United Kingdom (Ball and Vincent, 1998), it is legitimate to question
about the advantages of marketizing education and promoting the replacement of the
public school system by one dominated by private schools. In answering this question
Martin Carnoy (2000) questioned these supposed advantages:
When the available information is assembled in the U.S. and abroad, the
evidence suggests that “marketizing” education increases choice for a
certain fraction of parents but most likely does little or nothing to improve
overall student achievement. (p. 19)
The findings of this research support Carnoy’s remarks. It appears evident, then, that in
the case of Argentina before proceeding with the implementation of more “market
initiatives” to improve public education, it would be important to have a better
knowledge of the functioning of the supposedly better performing private schools. This
is especially relevant at the secondary level where private participation is large and very
heterogeneous.
I would, however, recommend that further studies about this topic follow Adam
Przeworsky cautions regarding the application of economic changes –or educational
ones– under “conditioned democratic situations.” Przeworsky (1991, p. 138) wondered
whether structural economic transformation can be sustained under democratic
conditions, or whether either reforms or democracy must be sacrificed.
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This is a threefold question: (1) What are the economic costs of such transformation? (2)
Under what political conditions are such costs most likely to be tolerated? (3) What is
the effect of transformation on democratic institutions? Przeworsky pointed out that
these questions mainly involve speculation informed on the one hand by economic
theory and on the other by fragile historical experience. Neither explanation appears to
be very useful or provide the final word on this matter. He concluded:
We have no theory of structural transformation, and the empirical evidence
is scanty. Market oriented reforms are a plunge into the unknown, a risky
historical experiment born out of desperation and driven by hope, not by
justifiable benefits. ( Pzreworski, 1991, p. 139)
I would like to conclude that today, nine years after Pzreworsky’s contention, the
empirical evidence is far from being scanty, and it indicates that market reforms in
education have not delivered “justifiable benefits,” at least not in terms of better
achievement and equality of opportunities for the majority of the population. Doubtless,
there are excellent private schools in Argentina and elsewhere offering wonderful and
meaningful educational opportunities for their students. But there are also wonderful
public schools that today are threatened by political negligence, which is self-justified by
the argument of the inevitability of globalization, as well as by blind faith in the
marketization of schooling. To forget the latter, and the continuous uncritical acceptance
of the “private school advantage,” seems not only naïve, but also dangerous.
Notes 
The notion of the so-called “Lost Decade” is very problematic and misleading. In
Argentina, during the “Lost Decade” groups of people did extremely well and
their “prosperity” was closely related to the impoverishment of the other sectors of
the population. During the period 1975-1990, the top third of the population (in
terms of income) increased its earnings by 26.2%, the middle class lost 9.2% of its
income while the income of the bottom third of the population fell by 14.9%
(Boron, 1992).
1.
The continuous demands by several national human rights groups as well as the
investigations of human rights abuses by international courts, expose the absurdity
of the “historical amnesia” prescribed by the government of President Alfonsin
and later by President Menem as the remedy to the horrors of Argentina’s past.
2.
Cheating in secondary schools appears to be very extensive. For some of my
respondents (teachers, principals, parents, and especially students) cheating is an
“institution,” one more of the many rituals that shape the experience of secondary
education. However, there are other voices that link cheating to the larger
structures of corruption that typify the daily life of the country. In fact, corruption
is such a visible topic that during the last few years, several books that dealt
directly with this topic were on the best sellers list. In two books, cheating in
schools was used as an example of the general level of corruption in Argentina.
(See, Grondona, Mariano. La Corrupcion. Buenos Aires, Planeta, 1993 and 
Moreno Ocampo, Luis. En Defensa Propia. Buenos Aires, Sudamericana, 1993).
In addition to these examples, at the University of Buenos Aires (UBA), one of the
few graduate courses offered not only to university students but also to the public
3.
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was about “Corruption.” Los Angeles Times reporter William Long notes,
“Universities sometimes come up with courses on subjects that reflect the spirit of
the times. A while back, a hot topic might have been, say, guerrilla war. Or more
recently rain forest ecology. These days the UBA is offering a seminar on
corruption.” October 19, 1993, H2.
References 
Argentina Ministerio de Cultura y Educación (1998) Resultados del la evaluación de la
calidad educativa 1993-1997.Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Cultura y Educación.
Arnove, Robert (1999) Reframing Comparative Education: The dialectic of the global
and the local, in Arnove, Robert and Torres Carlos Alberto (eds) Comparative
Education: The dialectic of the global and the local. Lanham, MD, Rowman and
Littlefield, 1-24. 
Aspiazu, D. (1985). Capitanes de la industria: El nuevo poder economico en la
Argentina. Buenos Aires: Legasa.
Ball, Stephen and Vincent, Carol. (1998) “I Heard it on the Grapevine” Hot Knowledge
and school choice. British Journal of Sociology of Education Vol. 19:3, 377-401
Beccaria, Luis., and Riquelme, Graciela. (1986). El gasto social en educación y la
distribucion del ingreso. Buenos Aires: FLACSO.
Blackmore, Jill (2000) Hanging on to the Edge: An Australian Case of Univeristy
Women and Globalization in Globalization and Education: Integration and
Contestation Across Cultures Stromquist, Nelly and Karen Monkman (eds.), Lanham,
MD Rowman and Littlefield 
Boron, Allberto. (1992). Transition towards democracy in Latin America. (mimeo)
Braslavsky, Cecilia. (1993). Transformaciones en curso en el sistema educativo
Argentino. Buenos Aires: FLACSO. 
Braslavsky, Cecilia. and Alejandra,. Birgin (1995). Quienes Enseñan hoy en la
Argentina. Braslavsky, C. and D. Filmus. Las Transformaciones de la Educación en 10
Años de Democracia. G. Tiramonti, C. Buenos Aires, Tesis-Norma Grupo Editorial:
65-106. 
Calcagno, Adolfo. (1985). La perversidad de la deuda externa Argentina. Buenos Aires:
Legasa. 
Carnoy, Martin (2000) School Choice? Or is it Privatization? Educational Researcher
Vol 29 (7) 15-21
Coulson Andrew J. (1994) Human Life, Human Organization and Education, Education
Policy Analysis Archives, 2 (9). available at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v2n9.html). 
Coleman, James S. (1992) Some points on Choice in Education. Sociology of Education,
Vol. 65 (4), 333-353 
30 of 35
Darling- Hammond, Linda (1993). Introduction. Review of Research in Education 19:
xi-xviii. 
Darling- Hammond, Linda (1997). The Right to Learn: A Blueprint for Creating Schools
that Work. San Francisco, Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Dussel, Inés, Tiramonti, Guillermina, Birgin, Alejandra (in press) Towards a new
cartography of curriculum reform. Reflections on the educational decentralization in
Argentina. In Popkewitz, Thomas, Educational Knowledge: Changing Relationships 
between the State, Civil Society, and Educational Community, Albany, SUNY Press.
The Economist. (2000, May 6). Getting from here to there. The Economist, 355 (8169).
Friedman, Milton. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. 
Fuller, Bruce. (1991). Growing up modern. London: Routledge. 
Gentilli, Pablo. (1994). Poder economico, ideologia y educación. Buenos Aires:
FLACSO-Miño y Davila.
Fischman, Gustavo. (2000). Imagining Teachers: Rethinking Gender Dynamics in
Teacher Education. Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield.
Fischman, Gustavo. (forthcoming). Print Media Reporting about Public Education and
Corporate Initiatives. Paper submitted to the 2001 Annual Conference of the 
Comparative and International Education Society. 
Fischman, Gustavo. and McLaren, Peter. (2000) Schooling for Democracy: Toward a
Critical Utopianism Contemporary Sociology: 29 (1) 168-180.
Gerchunoff, Pablo., and Torre, Juan. C. (1992). What role for the state in Latin America.
In Teitel, Simon (Ed.), Towards a new development strategy in Latin America. 
Washington, D.C.: IDB-John Hopkins University Press.
Gintis, Herbert (1991) Review of Politics, Markets and America's Schools. British 
Journal of Sociology of Education, 12,( 3) 380-386. 
Glass, Gene V. (1994) School Choice: A Discussion with Herbert Gintis. Educational 
Policy Analysis Archives, 2 (6). Available at http://epaa.asu.edu/epa a/v2n6.html.
Glass, Gene. V. and Dewayne Mathews (1991). Are Data Enough? Educational
Researcher 20(3): 24-28. 
Glass, Sandra R. (1997, January 6). Markets and myths: Autonomy in public and private
schools.Educational Policy Analysis Archives , 5 (1). Available at
http://olam.ed.asu.edu/e paa/v5n1/. 
Grondona, Mariano. (1993). La Corrupción. Buenos Aires: Planeta. 
Hanson, Mark. (1994). Strategies of educational decentralization: The cases of
31 of 35
Colombia, Argentina, Venezuela and Spain. Paper presented at the CIES Annual
Conference, San Diego. 
Torres, Carlos Alberto and Puiggrós, Adriana (1995) Editorial essay Comparative
Education Review, 39 (1) 1-27. 
Katz, Claudio. (1992). Economia Latinoamericana: De la decada perdida a la nueva
crisis. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Letra Buena.
Klees, Steven (1993) Resource Allocation and Social Choice in Education: The Need for
Alternative Criteria and Processes, mimeo, Florida State University
Kugler, Bernardo. (1991). Argentina reallocating resources for the improvement of
education. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Lauder, Hugh and Hughes, David. 1999 Trading in Futures: Why Markets in Education
Don’t Work, Philadelphia: Open University Press 
Llach, Juan Jose., Montoya Silvia., and Roldán, Flavia. Educación Para Todos,
Córdoba, IREAL, 1999.
Ministerio de Cultura y Educación. (1992). Mejoramiento y evaluacion de la calidad de
la educación. Buenos Aires: Proyecto MEJ-BIRF.
Moreno Ocampo, Luis. (1993). En defensa propia. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana. 
Nosiglia, Catalina., and Marquina, Monica. (1993). Ley de educación: Aportes para el
analisis y el debate. Propuesta Educativa, 5 (9), 89.
Nun, Jose. (1993) Democracy and modernization. Latin American Perspectives, 20 (4),
7-27. 
O’Donnell, Guillermo., & Schmiter, Peter. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule. 
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Peruzzotti, Enrique. (1993). The Weimarization of Argentine politics and state
autonomy. Thesis Eleven, 34, 127-139. 
Petras, James., & Morris, M. (1992). Latin America in the time of cholera. New York:
Routledge. 
Pini , Mónica Eva (2000) Lineamientos de Política Educativa en los Estados Unidos:
Debates Actuales; Significados para América Latina Educational Policy Analysis
Archives, 8 (8). Available at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n18.html.
Popkewitz, Thomas. S. and Brennan, Mary (1998). Foucault's Challenge: Discourse,
Knowledge, and Power in Education. New York, Teachers College Press.
Psacharopoulos, George. (1990). Fifteen questions and answers on quality education.
Education and Society, 8 (2), 35. 
Puiggrós, Adriana. (1990). Sujetos, disciplina y curriculum. Buenos Aires: Galerna.
32 of 35
Puiggrós, Adriana. (1992). Escuela democracia y orden (1916-1943). Buenos Aires:
Galerna. 
Pzreworski, Adam. (1991). Democracy and the market. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Rhoten, Diana. (July 1999). Global-Local Conditions of Possibility: The Case of
Education Descentralization in Argentina. Palo Alto, CA, Stanford University.
Robisnon, William I. (1999) Latin America and Global Capitalism. Race and Class 40
(2/3) 111-131
Rosenthal, Gerth. (1989). Latin America and Caribbean development in the 1980s and
the outlook for the future. CEPAL Review, 39, 1. 
Rothstein, Richard; Carnoy, Martin and Benveniste, Luis (1999) Can Public Schools 
Learn from Private Schools: Case Studies in the public and private nonprofit sectors
Washington, D.C. Economic Policy Institute
Samoff, Joel. (1991). Research, knowledge and policy in assistance to African
education: The financial-intellectual complex. Buenos Aires: XV World Conference of
the International Political Science Association.
Samoff, Joel. (1999) Institutionalizaing International Influence in Arnove, Robert and
Torres Carlos Alberto (eds) Comparative Education: The dialectic of the global and the
local. Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 25-51
Schvarzer, Jorge. (1992). The Argentine riddle in historical perspective. Latin American
Research Review, 27, 1. 
Sweetland, Scott R. (2000). Education Vouchers: Deliverance or Disaster? UCEA
Review, XVI (1) 1-10
Tedesco, Juan. Carlos. (1989). The role of the state in education. Prospects, XIX (4).
Tenti Fanfani, Emilio (1999) Teachers’ training, working conditions, and salary in
Argentina, in Randall, Laura and Joan Anderson (eds) Schooling for Success, Armok,
NY M.E. Sharpe. 265-276
Tironi, Eduardo., and Lagos, Ricardo. (1991). Social actors and structural adjustment.
CEPAL Review, 44.
UNESCO (1999) Statistical Yearbook., Lanham, MD: UNESCO-Bernan Press. 
UNLU (National University of Lujan). (1991). Evolucion de los salarios docentes en la
Argentina. Lujan, Argentina: National University of Lujan.
Viteritti, Joseph (1999) Choosing Equality: School Choice the Constitution and Civil
Society. Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press
Wells, Amy, and Biegel, Stuart. (1993). Public funds for private schools: Political and
first amendment considerations. American Journal of Education, 101 (3). 
33 of 35
World Bank. (1995). Decentralization and Improvement of Secondary Education and
Polymodal Education Development Project, Washington D.C.: World Bank.
About the Author
Gustavo Fischman, Ph.D.
Email: fischman@asu.edu
Gustavo Fischman is an Associate Professor in the Division of Educational Foundations
and Interdivisional Studies, at California State University, Los Angeles (on leave from
Arizona State University). His most recent book is Fischman, G. (2000) Imagining 
Teachers: Rethinking Teacher Education and Gender. Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield.
Copyright 2001 by the Education Policy Analysis Archives
The World Wide Web address for the Education Policy Analysis Archives is epaa.asu.edu
General questions about appropriateness of topics or particular articles may be
addressed to the Editor, Gene V Glass, glass@asu.edu or reach him at College
of Education, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-0211.
(602-965-9644). The Commentary Editor is Casey D. Cobb:
casey.cobb@unh.edu .
EPAA Editorial Board
Michael W. Apple
University of Wisconsin
Greg Camilli
Rutgers University
John Covaleskie
Northern Michigan University
Alan Davis 
University of Colorado, Denver
Sherman Dorn
University of South Florida
Mark E. Fetler
California Commission on Teacher Credentialing
Richard Garlikov
hmwkhelp@scott.net
Thomas F. Green
Syracuse University
Alison I. Griffith
York University
Arlen Gullickson
Western Michigan University
Ernest R. House
University of Colorado
Aimee Howley
Ohio University
Craig B. Howley
Appalachia Educational Laboratory
William Hunter
University of Calgary
Daniel Kallós
Umeå University
Benjamin Levin
University of Manitoba
Thomas Mauhs-Pugh
Green Mountain College
Dewayne Matthews
Education Commission of the States
William McInerney
Purdue University
Mary McKeown-Moak
MGT of America (Austin, TX)
34 of 35
Les McLean
University of Toronto
Susan Bobbitt Nolen
University of Washington
Anne L. Pemberton
apembert@pen.k12.va.us
Hugh G. Petrie
SUNY Buffalo
Richard C. Richardson
New York University
Anthony G. Rud Jr.
Purdue University
Dennis Sayers
California State University—Stanislaus
Jay D. Scribner
University of Texas at Austin
Michael Scriven
scriven@aol.com
Robert E. Stake 
University of Illinois—UC
Robert Stonehill
U.S. Department of Education
David D. Williams
Brigham Young University
EPAA Spanish Language Editorial Board
Associate Editor for Spanish Language
Roberto Rodríguez Gómez 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
roberto@servidor.unam.mx 
Adrián Acosta (México)
Universidad de Guadalajara
adrianacosta@compuserve.com
J. Félix Angulo Rasco (Spain)
Universidad de Cádiz
felix.angulo@uca.es
Teresa Bracho (México)
Centro de Investigación y Docencia
Económica-CIDE
bracho dis1.cide.mx
Alejandro Canales (México) 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México
canalesa@servidor.unam.mx
Ursula Casanova (U.S.A.)
Arizona State University
casanova@asu.edu
José Contreras Domingo
Universitat de Barcelona 
Jose.Contreras@doe.d5.ub.es
Erwin Epstein (U.S.A.)
Loyola University of Chicago
Eepstein@luc.edu
Josué González (U.S.A.)
Arizona State University
josue@asu.edu
Rollin Kent (México)
Departamento de Investigación
Educativa-DIE/CINVESTAV
rkent@gemtel.com.mx      
kentr@data.net.mx
María Beatriz Luce (Brazil)
Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do 
Sul-UFRGS
lucemb@orion.ufrgs.br
Javier Mendoza Rojas (México)
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México
javiermr@servidor.unam.mx
Marcela Mollis (Argentina)
Universidad de Buenos Aires
mmollis@filo.uba.ar
Humberto Muñoz García (México)
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de
México
humberto@servidor.unam.mx
Angel Ignacio Pérez Gómez (Spain)
Universidad de Málaga
aiperez@uma.es
35 of 35
Daniel Schugurensky
(Argentina-Canadá)
OISE/UT, Canada
dschugurensky@oise.utoronto.ca
Simon Schwartzman (Brazil)
Fundação Instituto Brasileiro e Geografia
e Estatística 
simon@openlink.com.br 
Jurjo Torres Santomé (Spain)
Universidad de A Coruña
jurjo@udc.es
Carlos Alberto Torres (U.S.A.)
University of California, Los Angeles
torres@gseisucla.edu
